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Introduction 
 
 
Germany and NATO Missile Defence 
Between Adaptation and Persistence 
Marcel Dickow, Katarzyna Kubiak, Oliver Meier and Michael Paul 
At the 2010 Lisbon summit, the NATO allies decided to develop a joint missile defence 
system as a core element of collective defence. Since then, the security environment 
has changed fundamentally. The hopes of cooperating with Moscow on missile defence 
have been shattered, while the nuclear deal with Iran reduces the threat from the south 
and thus undermines one of the central justifications for the proposed system. At the 
same time, the alliance has made progress in its efforts to protect its territory, forces 
and populations from missile attacks. While the fundamental decision to create a mis-
sile defence system is likely to hold, the German Bundestag should consider the foreign 
policy, security, industrial, arms control and financial implications before approving 
any additional German contributions. 
 
NATO hopes to achieve initial operational 
capability of its missile defence system 
before the July 2016 Warsaw Summit, thus 
providing a limited capacity to protect 
NATO territory from ballistic missile attack. 
Fundamental changes in the alliance’s secu-
rity environment since 2013 have not led to 
significant adjustments of missile defence 
plans. This is surprising, given the trans-
formation of security relations with the two 
states capable of threatening NATO terri-
tory with medium- or intermediate range 
missiles: Russia following its aggression 
against Ukraine, and Iran after the signing 
of the nuclear agreement in July 2015. 
NATO’s insistence on pushing ahead 
with a missile defence system does not 
necessarily imply agreement over its pur-
pose and goal. The lack of a debate can be 
explained by Washington’s sustained will-
ingness to fund the programme almost 
entirely itself. For many, the political costs 
of changing course also appears higher 
than those of continuing the programme. 
The multi-faceted nature of NATO’s missile 
defence system permits each NATO member 
to justify support from its own specific 
perspective, without the necessity to align 
these justifications with those of others. 
NATO Missile Defence or 
US Protection for NATO? 
In 2009, US President Barack Obama aban-
doned his predecessor’s plans to construct 
US missile defence bases in Poland and 
the Czech Republic on the basis of bilateral 
agreements. Instead, Obama decided to 
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establish a NATO system. At the time, Ger-
many and other allies welcomed his deci-
sion. They hoped that the US contribution – 
the so-called European Phased Adaptive 
Approach (EPAA) – would provide them with 
greater influence on the development and 
deployment of the US missile defence sys-
tems stationed in Europe. States like Germa-
ny also expected the chances of a coopera-
tive arrangement with Russia to improve. 
One year later, at the Lisbon summit, 
NATO decided to make missile defence a 
core element of collective defence. Here, 
for the first time, NATO set itself the target 
of protecting the NATO populations and 
territories against missile attack. Existing 
and planned capacities to protect NATO 
forces against short-range missile attack 
were also integrated into the new system. 
Member states decide on the basis of 
their national threat assessments which 
sensors (radar, satellite) and interceptors 
they contribute to the system. Under the 
EPAA, the United States provides by far the 
largest share of capacities. Land- and sea-
based Aegis anti-missile systems are key to 
territorial missile defence. American Stan-
dard Missiles 3 (SM-3) form the backbone 
of the system. SM-3s are designed to destroy 
incoming medium- and intermediate-range 
missiles in mid-flight by direct impact (“hit 
to kill”), outside the earth’s atmosphere. 
In Phase 1 of the EPAA, the United States 
in 2011 deployed a first warship equipped 
with the Aegis missile defence system in the 
Mediterranean. A mobile AN/TPY-2 radar was 
stationed at Kürecik, Turkey, to gather data 
on incoming missiles and transmit it to the 
command and control centres. 
EPAA Phase 2 was completed at the end 
of 2015, when the Aegis Ashore missile de-
fence base at Deveselu, Romania, achieved 
technical readiness and began test and train-
ing operations. Meanwhile, four US navy 
ships equipped with SM-3 interceptors were 
also stationed at Rota, Spain. 
In order for initial operational capability 
to be declared at the July 2016 Summit, the 
system has to provide at least a limited 
capability to protect alliance territories 
from missile attack. Amongst other things, 
NATO will have to demonstrate through 
exercises, tests and training that the sen-
sors and interceptors are connected and 
interfaced with Headquarters Allied Air 
Command at Ramstein. 
The third and final phase of EPAA is due 
to be completed by 2018, when the Aegis 
Ashore missile defence base at Redzikowo, 
Poland, becomes operational. Only then is 
NATO missile defence expected to protect 
the populations, territories and armed forces 
of all European NATO members against a 
limited ballistic missile attack. NATO has 
declared that zones with different levels of 
security across the region are unacceptable. 
Originally, the United States had 
planned for a fourth phase of EPAA. This 
would have involved the development and 
deployment of more capable interceptors 
(SM-3 IIB). Washington terminated EPAA 
Phase 4 in March 2013, citing funding dif-
ficulties and the growing threat presented 
by North Korean missile capabilities. In 
fact, the move should also be interpreted 
as a conciliatory gesture towards Russia. 
Moscow had criticised the plan to station 
SM-3 IIBs because these missiles could po-
tentially have been capable of intercepting 
Russian intercontinental missiles targeted 
at the United States. 
NATO will continue to expand its ballis-
tic missile defence capabilities after 2018. 
Current plans include developing and pro-
curing new tactical air defence systems 
and improving the networking of existing 
system components. 
In the event of crisis, NATO’s command 
and control centre would give the orders to 
launch interceptors. Because such a decision 
would have to be taken extremely quickly, 
the launch order would have to be given on 
the basis of rules of engagement agreed in 
advance among allies. 
Ramstein is the headquarters of the US 
Air Forces in Europe, which commands 
the American part of the system (including 
Aegis vessels) during peacetime. It is still 
unclear which EPAA components will be 
placed permanently under NATO com-
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mand, and which elements will be assigned 
to NATO only in times of crisis. 
NATO establishes and funds the missile 
defence system’s command, control and 
communications infrastructure. In 2010, 
then-NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen estimated the overall cost of up-
grading the alliance’s program to serve ter-
ritorial missile defence purposes to be less 
than €200 million, over a period of ten years. 
Many experts regard that figure as wildly 
over-optimistic. Ivo Daalder, then US Per-
manent Representative to NATO, stated in 
2012 that the allies had pledged more than 
€1 billion for the system’s command, con-
trol and communications infrastructure. 
NATO missile defence thus remains 
essentially an American programme. Euro-
peans will only be able to influence the 
system’s set-up if they are willing to provide 
corresponding funds. 
The German Contribution 
Like all NATO members, Germany con-
tributes financially to the development of 
the joint command and control system. 
Germany is also directly involved in three 
elements of the NATO missile defence. 
Firstly, Germany hosts the command and 
control centre in Ramstein. 
Secondly, Germany has pledged a Patriot 
contingent with up to three launchers as a 
contribution to the NATO missile defence 
system; Patriot missiles can intercept short-
range ballistic missiles and aircraft. 
Thirdly, Germany provides staff to the 
German-Dutch Competence Centre for Sur-
face-based Air and Missile Defence in Ram-
stein, which plans and coordinates air de-
fence activities, promotes interoperability 
between NATO forces and cooperates with 
NATO’s missile defence command structure. 
In June 2015, the German defence minis-
try decided to develop and procure a tac-
tical air and missile defence system based 
onthe Medium Extended Air Defence Sys-
tem (MEADS) design to replace the existing 
Patriot anti-missile system by 2025. It re-
mains unclear which partners will develop 
this system jointly with Germany, how 
existing development risks can be mini-
mised, when the project will enter series 
production, and how the tactical air and 
missile defence system is to be integrated 
into the NATO missile defence system. 
A political decision on equipping German 
frigates with missile defence capability also 
has yet to be taken. The German Bundes-
wehr is currently investigating the extent 
to which its three F-124 frigates could be 
equipped with sensor capability for detect-
ing and tracking missiles at high-altitudes. 
On this naval aspect, Germany is collabo-
rating closely with the Netherlands and Den-
mark, which are planning to equip three, 
respectively four frigates with adapted sen-
sors suitable for NATO missile defence. The 
objective of the trilateral cooperation is to 
adapt existing sensors, so that they are able 
to detect incoming missiles within and 
above the atmosphere and to guide inter-
ceptors to their targets. 
Since April 2015 the German Navy Com-
mand in Rostock has been leading trilateral 
efforts to develop a capability to intercept 
missiles outside the atmosphere. Germany’s 
leading role is particularly significant 
because these efforts are taking place in the 
context of the Framework Nation Concept. 
This concept, supported by Berlin, aims to 
establish a division of labour among allies 
in the development of particular military 
capabilities, in order to make them widely 
available. 
What Is the Threat? 
According to NATO, the proposed missile 
defence system is a hedge against the pro-
liferation of ballistic missiles. The alliance 
believes that more than thirty countries 
possess ballistic missiles or are in the pro-
cess of acquiring them, but the alliance has 
not named any specific country as a threat. 
Importantly, missile defence is to provide 
protection only against threats from out-
side the Euro-Atlantic area. 
Iran, Israel, Russia, Saudi Arabia and 
Syria all possess medium-range missiles 
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capable of reaching NATO territory. Given 
that Israel and Saudi Arabia are partners 
and NATO has repeatedly insisted that 
its missile defence system is not directed 
against Russia, only Syria and in particular 
Iran remain as potential threats. 
In 2009, Obama cited the declining 
threat posed by Iranian long-range missiles 
as a key reason for reconfiguring US missile 
defence plans in Europe. Iran is currently 
focusing on efforts to improve short- and 
medium-range missiles. Washington recent-
ly confirmed that Iran is expected to have 
the capacity to build long-range missiles 
capable of directly threatening the United 
States by 2020 at the earliest. But Iran 
already possesses medium-range missiles 
capable of reaching parts of NATO territory. 
It is unclear what implications the agree-
ment on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action to resolve the conflict over Iran’s 
nuclear programme will have on NATO’s 
missile defence plans. Successful implemen-
tation of the agreement would permanently 
block Iran’s options to acquire nuclear 
weapons. The danger of Tehran threatening 
Europe with nuclear-armed missiles would 
cease to exist. However, Iran is permitted 
to continue developing and testing conven-
tional missile technologies. Yet, transfers 
of missile technology to Iran are subject to 
approval by the Security Council within 
the first eight years of the JCPOA. 
The threat of Syria’s missile arsenal has 
also reduced because a large proportion of 
the available weapons have already been 
used in the civil war. 
In view of these developments, it is no 
surprise that the development of the NATO 
missile defence system is now justified 
primarily in terms of the threat of prolif-
eration, rather than by any concrete threat 
from a state outside the Euro-Atlantic area. 
What Are the Objectives of NATO 
Missile Defence? 
By developing a missile defence system, 
NATO is firstly seeking to prevent any 
potential enemy from considering a ballis-
tic missile attack on its territory. As such, 
missile defence is seen as a means of deter-
rence by denial. 
In the event of that strategy failing, sec-
ondly, it seeks to limit the damage caused 
by an attack. While no missile defence sys-
tem can provide absolute protection, from 
NATO’s perspective, neutralising even just 
a proportion of incoming missiles justifies 
the system. This argument applies in par-
ticular where the attacker possesses deploy-
able weapons of mass destruction. 
Thirdly, a missile defence system is sup-
posed to buy time during regional crises 
and thus increase the alliance’s freedom of 
action. The scenario of Iran blockading the 
Strait of Hormuz is sometimes cited in this 
connection. If Iran simultaneously threat-
ened Europe with (nuclear-armed) medium-
range missiles, it could – in this scenario – 
deter NATO from intervening decisively. A 
missile defence system would, it is argued, 
shift the dynamic in such a regional conflict 
to the West’s advantage. NATO would retain 
the initiative if it denies the aggressor cer-
tainty about the success of a missile attack 
and thus undermines its deterrent potential. 
This latter scenario is widely discussed 
among security experts, but much less so 
in political circles. An open debate about 
whether NATO can and should strengthen 
its capacity for intervention by developing 
missile defence systems would therefore be 
desirable. 
What Can NATO Missile Defence 
Achieve? 
The difficulties associated with technical 
realisation of a missile defence system are 
at least as great as the experts’ doubts 
about its effectiveness. It is almost impos-
sible to predict the performance of such 
a complex system, which depends on the 
effect and efficiency of internal and exter-
nal parameters including the type of in-
coming missile; the flight time, velocity 
and size of the target; length of warning 
time; weather conditions; counter-meas-
ures; sensor performance and networking. 
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The effectiveness of the NATO missile 
defence system can only be tested and 
measured for narrowly defined cases 
because the system combines and interfaces 
different interceptor and sensor systems, 
some of which are mobile. Generally speak-
ing, tactical anti-missile systems with per-
manently networked sensor and shooter 
systems (such as Patriot) operating in de-
fined areas are more effective than hetero-
geneous systems of systems. 
The SM-3 generation IA and IB intercep-
tors stationed in Romania and on Aegis 
naval vessels form the heart of EPAA and 
have been comprehensively tested against 
medium- and intermediate-range missiles. 
According to the US Missile Defence Agency, 
thirty-three of the forty tests conducted 
since 2002 were successful. Virtually no 
data on the test conditions is available, 
however, so it is doubtful whether this high 
rate of success would be achievable under 
realistic, real-world conditions. In particu-
lar, networking the huge number of sensors 
is a great challenge. 
The critical components also include 
the radar sensors. Aegis ships currently use 
AN/SPY-1 S-band radar, while a mobile AN/ 
TPY-2 X-band radar is stationed in Turkey. 
Radar equipment already installed on Ger-
man and other European warships can 
essentially be used, but only after expensive 
adaptation. A demonstration in 2015 would 
suggest that such heterogeneous sensor net-
works and different command and shooter 
infrastructures can function properly to-
gether. But tests under realistic conditions 
have not yet been conducted. 
Designing missile defence systems that 
could cope with all conceivable warheads 
and countermeasures is technically com-
plex and very expensive. Decoys and elec-
tronic countermeasures can impair the 
effectiveness of missile defence systems, 
especially if interception takes place 
beyond the earth’s atmosphere. In that 
sense, the attacker always has the ad-
vantage of being able to exploit specific 
weaknesses of the system. 
Does Missile Defence Strengthen 
Cohesion in NATO? 
As a joint alliance project, missile defence 
is supposed to strengthen the commitment 
to collective defence. Yet, there are certain 
differences of opinion, both between and 
within NATO states, on whether and how 
missile defence will affect the alliance’s 
cohesion. Some NATO states see the pur-
pose of the project primarily in protection 
against threats from the south. Others 
emphasise that the missile defence bases 
are a visible expression of America’s secu-
rity guarantees for Europe – by which they 
mean above all protection against Russia. 
Competing industrial interests associat-
ed with the creation of missile defence 
systems can also weaken NATO’s cohesion. 
For example, in 2013 the United States 
withdrew from the development of the 
MEADS air defence system, which the Euro-
pean partners continued to support. And 
at the end of 2015, the new Polish govern-
ment called into question its predecessor’s 
plans to equip the Wisła air defence system 
with the US Patriot systems, in the hope of 
achieving a better deal. For two years, Tur-
key shortlisted a Chinese missile defence 
system provider, despite considerable NATO 
reservations against the inclusion of Chinese 
technology in the alliance’s system. In the 
meantime, Turkey is considering either 
developing and manufacturing the technol-
ogy domestically, or acquiring fully-devel-
oped systems from NATO allies. 
By comparison, few joint projects exist 
within NATO to develop or produce missile 
defence technology. The only system apart 
from MEADS is one based on the Aster mis-
sile – which can intercept targets including 
short-range ballistic missiles – that France, 
the United Kingdom and Italy are jointly de-
veloping and producing. At this point, the 
Americans have not made any NATO mem-
ber a partner in developing core technol-
ogies, as Japan has become in the Aegis pro-
gramme. Japan was, however, willing to in-
vest up to $1 billion to become a US partner. 
The Americans have long been warning 
Europe against free-riding. Especially in 
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Congress, there are growing calls for the 
European allies to pull their weight on 
missile defence. Expectations that missile 
defence will strengthen alliance cohesion 
are only realistic as long as all involved 
are willing to stick to the existing division 
of labour, and as long as they resist the 
temptation to use the project as leverage 
for achieving unrelated goals. 
Does Missile Defence Deepen 
Conflict with Russia? 
When NATO decided in 2010 to create a 
missile defence system, the German govern-
ment hoped that missile defence might be 
an instrument to strengthen security co-
operation with Russia. Between 2010 and 
2012 NATO and Russia did indeed explore 
possibilities of cooperation. 
In the meantime, it has become clear 
that Russia’s problems with missile defence 
are fundamental in nature. Moscow fears 
that future US missile defence capabilities 
could negate Russia’s nuclear second-strike 
capacity. Russia is concerned about the 
flexible, global and open architecture of 
the planned American system. 
Moscow consequently demands legally-
binding assurances that the interceptors 
stationed in Europe will not target Russia’s 
strategic nuclear arsenal. Other demands 
raised by the Kremlin in recent years in-
clude: complete integration of Russia into 
the system, all interceptors to be deployed 
outside the Euro-Atlantic region, restrictions 
on the number of interceptors, limits on 
the velocity of interceptors, and restrictions 
on the number of missile defence bases. 
The United States is not prepared to 
limit its missile defence plans by giving any 
such guarantee. The Administration’s 
hands are tied on these questions because 
Congress has repeatedly made clear – by 
large majorities – that it will not accept any 
restrictions on US missile defence plans. 
At the end of 2013 Russia ended the dia-
logue with NATO on its missile defence 
plans. NATO, in turn, in April 2014 broke-
off working-level contacts with Russia in 
response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea. 
Moscow justifies resumption of develop-
ment work on new nuclear warheads and 
delivery systems by the necessity to over-
come US missile defence systems. In the 
coming years Russia intends to operate five 
different types of intercontinental missiles 
with manoeuvrable warheads and/or the 
ability to reach the United States via the 
southern hemisphere. The development 
and procurement of long-range cruise mis-
siles can also be seen as a response to US 
missile defence plans. Russia has also re-
peatedly threatened to withdraw from 
nuclear arms control agreements and to 
station nuclear-capable Iskander short-
range missiles in Kaliningrad. In March 
2015, the Russian ambassador in Copen-
hagen even warned of the possibility of 
nuclear strikes against Danish naval vessels 
involved in NATO missile defence. 
The expansion of missile defence capaci-
ties thus drives arms races in Europe and 
elsewhere. That should come as no surprise, 
given that historically (anticipated) improve-
ments in one side’s defensive capabilities 
have generally led to the expansion of of-
fensive capacities by the other side. 
Some observers hope that the establish-
ment of a NATO missile defence system will 
make it easier to reduce the role of nuclear 
weapons. The Obama Administration has 
set an objective – especially in regional cri-
sis scenarios – of moving from “deterrence by 
retaliation” to a new type of “deterrence 
by denial”. But these hopes tied to missile 
defences have not been fulfilled in reality. 
For example, EPAA has not reduced the im-
portance attached to US nuclear weapons 
deployed in Europe. 
Implications for Germany 
The plans to establish a missile defence 
system in NATO have reached a point where 
it would appear almost impossible to aban-
don the project. Plans for completing the 
third EPAA phase by 2018 are firm. Con-
struction of the second Aegis Ashore missile 
defence base in Poland will begin shortly. 
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For other elements of the missile defence 
system, final decisions have yet to be taken. 
In advance of the Warsaw Summit, the 
allies are debating the alliance’s security 
and defence posture. In order to reduce 
conflicts over aspects such as funding, con-
figuration, deployment and – not least – 
use of the missile defences, the system’s 
rationale should be revisited. From the Ger-
man perspective, a number of unresolved 
questions exist that should be answered 
before Berlin takes decisions to expand 
its participation in NATO missile defence. 
From the security perspective the threat 
analysis needs to be clarified. At the mo-
ment, there are different opinions about 
what NATO intends to defend against. It 
must also be asked whether the successful 
implementation of the Iran agreement 
would not offer sufficient reason to re-evalu-
ate the scope and timeframe of the project. 
From the military perspective, the perfor-
mance of the system should be assessed 
from different perspectives. Experience has 
already been gathered with intercepting 
short-range missiles. Defence against 
medium-range and intermediate-range 
missiles has only been tested in a handful 
of cases, and these were rarely based on 
realistic conditions. In this context, it is 
also important to ask to what extent Ger-
many and other European NATO allies 
would be included in decisions to deploy 
or use missile defence systems in times of 
peace or crisis. Finally, in terms of includ-
ing German frigates in the system, the pos-
sible negative impact on the German navy’s 
overall operational capability needs to be 
taken into account. 
From the alliance perspective, it should be 
considered whether and how NATO allies 
can better reconcile the different objectives 
associated with the creation of a missile 
defence system. The difficult process of 
deciding to deploy – and later withdraw – 
Patriot systems from Turkey is an indica-
tion of negative consequences differences 
over missile defences could have for the 
alliance’s cohesion. In particular, the ques-
tion needs to be asked what influence 
Europe would have on the possible use of 
such capabilities in times of crisis. 
The deployment of effective missile 
defence systems could have positive reper-
cussions for arms control, if it reduces the 
political and military importance of nuclear 
weapons. But at the same time, the danger 
of new arms races grows. This security di-
lemma can be reduced by confidence-build-
ing and other cooperative mechanisms, but 
it cannot be resolved. Specifically, measures 
to improve transparency, such as visits, 
inspections or even the stationing of liaison 
officers at missile defence bases could help 
to allay Moscow’s concerns about NATO’s 
system being used against Russia. 
The financial risks of German participa-
tion in missile defence are currently 
limited, to the extent that it is largely left 
to the member-states themselves to decide 
on the type and scale of their contribution. 
But that situation could change should the 
United States no longer be willing to con-
tribute the lion’s share of the cost of the sys-
tem in Europe. In Congress, calls for a larger 
European financial contribution already 
grow louder. 
The decision on a MEADS-based tactical 
air and missile defence system was partly 
motivated by industrial policy, led by the 
hope that the development of key compo-
nents in Europe would offer technological 
and labour market advantages over an 
American solution. However, in the short- 
to medium-term Europe and Germany have 
few comparable capabilities to contribute 
to the development of systems to defend 
against medium- and intermediate-range 
missile systems. 
The expansion of missile defence capabil-
ities will continue after the Warsaw Sum-
mit, as will the debate over the system’s 
role in NATO’s deterrence and defence 
posture. Whether and how Germany par-
ticipates beyond the contributions already 
promised should not be decided until a 
thorough debate has been conducted over 
the outlined aspects of the multi-faceted 
project of “missile defence in NATO”. 
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